No Identity Theft Claim Against Bank That Sold Account
In Satey v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit shed some light on the limitations of California’s potentially broad Identity Theft Law (Civ. Code § 1798.92-1798.97), which allows a victim of identity theft to sue a “Claimant” to recover damages, civil penalties, and attorney’s fees. Under the statute, a “Claimant” is “a person who has or purports to have a claim for money or an interest in property in connection with a transaction procured through identity theft.” (Civ. Code § 1798.93(a)). In Satey, the Court upheld summary judgment against plaintiff, holding that credit card issuer Chase was not a “Claimant” under California’s Identity Theft Law, and therefore could not be sued, because Chase had sold plaintiff’s credit card account to another company before plaintiff filed his complaint.
In Satey, plaintiff sued Chase in connection with a May 19, 2002, credit card charge at the Jackpot 98 Cent Store in Glendale, California, in excess of $8,000 which plaintiff alleged resulted from identity theft. (Chase had investigated plaintiff’s identity theft claim rejected it.) On March 28, 2003, Chase sold plaintiff’s account to Trilogy Capital Management, LLC. Trilogy sold plaintiff’s account to Great Seneca Financial Corporation on December 6, 2004. Plaintiff filed his complaint on October 31, 2005. In the district court, plaintiff settled his claims against credit reporting agency Experian and dismissed his claims against Great Seneca. The district court granted summary judgment for Chase. Plaintiff appealed.
After first finding that the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law identity theft claim, the Ninth Circuit upheld summary judgment against plaintiff. The Court held that Chase was not a “claimant” under the California Identity Theft Law— because Chase had sold plaintiff’s account before plaintiff filed his complaint, it did not have or purport to have “a claim for money or an interest in property” against plaintiff. Significantly, the Court noted that the four year statute of limitations would reset each time a new “claimant” purchased or pursued the debt against plaintiff.
The Court left unanswered the most critical question in the case: how does anyone spend more than $8,000 in a 98-cent store?
In Satey, plaintiff sued Chase in connection with a May 19, 2002, credit card charge at the Jackpot 98 Cent Store in Glendale, California, in excess of $8,000 which plaintiff alleged resulted from identity theft. (Chase had investigated plaintiff’s identity theft claim rejected it.) On March 28, 2003, Chase sold plaintiff’s account to Trilogy Capital Management, LLC. Trilogy sold plaintiff’s account to Great Seneca Financial Corporation on December 6, 2004. Plaintiff filed his complaint on October 31, 2005. In the district court, plaintiff settled his claims against credit reporting agency Experian and dismissed his claims against Great Seneca. The district court granted summary judgment for Chase. Plaintiff appealed.
After first finding that the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law identity theft claim, the Ninth Circuit upheld summary judgment against plaintiff. The Court held that Chase was not a “claimant” under the California Identity Theft Law— because Chase had sold plaintiff’s account before plaintiff filed his complaint, it did not have or purport to have “a claim for money or an interest in property” against plaintiff. Significantly, the Court noted that the four year statute of limitations would reset each time a new “claimant” purchased or pursued the debt against plaintiff.
The Court left unanswered the most critical question in the case: how does anyone spend more than $8,000 in a 98-cent store?
